Cinemorphosis

Category: philosophy

  • Precision Displacement: When the Bezel Replaces the Mirror

    Precision Displacement: When the Bezel Replaces the Mirror

    You know, at least in theory, that the soul deserves more attention than the watch box. But theory is one thing; the comfort of brushed titanium is another. The soul is abstract, unruly, and resistant to instruction. There is no manual, no torque specification, no authorized service interval. A watch, by contrast, behaves. It offers dimensions, tolerances, finishes, and measurable improvements. You can change a strap and feel progress. You can regulate a movement and feel control. The inner life asks unsettling questions; the outer object gives reassuring answers. And so, without ever making a formal decision, you begin treating the collection while postponing the treatment of yourself. The watches become a buffer—a polished, luminous perimeter against the vague anxiety of being a finite creature with unfinished business.

    This drift has a name: Precision Displacement Syndrome—the habit of redirecting emotional or spiritual uncertainty into domains that reward technical exactness. Instead of confronting meaning, identity, or mortality, you refine alignment, accuracy, and material quality. The language shifts accordingly. You stop asking whether your life is coherent and start asking whether the bezel action is crisp. The psyche seeks certainty wherever it can find it, and mechanics provide something the soul does not: compliance.

    Over time, this pattern produces a strange and impressive asymmetry. The collection improves. It becomes curated, rationalized, and narrated with the solemnity of a museum catalog. Meanwhile, the interior landscape narrows. Complexity is replaced by control; vulnerability by optimization. This is Gollumification—the quiet contraction of the inner life alongside the expansion of horological expertise. Faced with the untidy work of self-examination, the enthusiast retreats into the clean world of case thickness, lume performance, crown feel, and strap chemistry, where every unease can be translated into a specification and every mood can be managed with a purchase.

    The final transformation is subtle but unmistakable. Precision Displacement Syndrome does the thinking for you. Instead of asking, Who am I becoming? you ask, Is this the correct lug width? The watches grow more refined, more intentional, more spiritually justified. The wearer grows more guarded, more dependent, more quietly organized around objects that stabilize his emotional climate. Like Tolkien’s cave-dweller, he becomes pale but authoritative, whispering “my precious” over a perfectly regulated timepiece—externally upgraded, internally undernourished, and increasingly persuaded that mastery of the mechanism is a close enough substitute for mastery of his life.

  • Horological Deconversion: When the Romance Finally Breaks

    Horological Deconversion: When the Romance Finally Breaks

    I recently wrote an essay arguing that pursuing mechanical watches in a digital world is a kind of elegant absurdity—an expensive devotion to obsolete technology while the rest of civilization marches toward sensors, satellites, and software. My proposed remedy was simple and slightly heretical: sell the mechanicals and replace them with an atomic or Bluetooth G-Shock. Accuracy, durability, zero drama. Efficiency instead of romance. Sanity instead of ritual.

    The piece was meant to provoke. Not just readers—me. Writing, after all, is less self-expression than self-interrogation. As Kafka put it, it’s the axe for the frozen sea. Sometimes the ice you crack belongs to your own illusions.

    What began as a tongue-in-cheek thought experiment turned into something less comfortable. It forced me to examine the possibility that my love for mechanical watches isn’t love at all—it’s theology.

    Over the years I refined my taste, sold the excess, and curated a tight collection of mechanical divers. Vintage aesthetic. Tool-watch credibility. A faint whiff of James Bond climbing out of the ocean with a harpoon gun and moral certainty. I told myself this evolution reflected discernment, maturity, identity.

    But the thought experiment raised a harder question: Did I discover my taste—or manufacture it?

    Human beings have a habit of building sacred spaces inside a profane world. Perhaps my watches became sacred cows—objects elevated not because they were necessary, but because I needed something to stand against modern life. Mechanical time as resistance. Analog as virtue. Nostalgia as courage.

    In this story, I cast myself as a quiet rebel.

    But what if the story is fiction?

    What if I’m not resisting anything at all? What if I’ve simply joined a small tribe of aging enthusiasts who reassure each other that spending thousands on obsolete machines is an act of character rather than consumerism?

    At that point, the romance starts to look like cosplay.

    Thousands spent on purchase. Thousands more on service. All to reenact a cinematic memory of youth. The whole enterprise begins to resemble those baseball fantasy camps where middle-aged men pay to take batting practice with retired heroes and pretend, for a weekend, that the dream never ended.

    The thought experiment did something dangerous: it planted a fantasy.

    Sell everything.

    Replace the collection with one or two G-Shocks.

    Start over.

    The appeal isn’t the watch. It’s the psychological reset. The possibility of closing a chapter and reclaiming the mental bandwidth the hobby quietly occupies. Change, after all, is the most intoxicating drug available to a restless mind.

    I’ve felt this kind of impulse before.

    In 2005, after three decades of gym culture, I was standing in an LA Fitness in Torrance, wiping someone else’s sweat off a treadmill while pop music pounded overhead and everyone talked about nothing. The thought hit me with sudden clarity: I need to get out of here.

    Within a week I’d left the gym, bought kettlebells, started power yoga in my garage, and never went back. At the time it felt impulsive. In hindsight, it was alignment—something deep finally overriding inertia.

    I sometimes wonder if watch collectors experience the same internal shift—the moment when accumulation feels less like passion and more like weight. The urge to take a wrecking ball to the collection. To simplify. To breathe.

    This moment has a name: Horological Deconversion—the quiet psychological turn when watches stop looking like identity and start looking like artifacts of habit, mythology, and sunk cost.

    I know someone who went through it. A serious collector. Deeply invested. One day he had the overwhelming urge to sell everything and replace the collection with a $20 Casio F-91W. Eventually he did. He told me the move saved his sanity.

    He still reads the forums. Still watches the madness unfold. But now he’s an observer, not a participant. The zoo is still interesting when you’re no longer inside the cage.

    Anyone who sells their mechanical collection, buys a single indestructible digital, and walks away lighter will have my respect. Not because minimalism is virtuous, but because exits are hard. Leaving a closed system always is.

    There’s something quietly heroic about it—the horological version of a Shawshank escape. Crawl through the tunnel. Emerge on the other side. Stand in the rain and realize the prison was partly self-built.

    And somewhere beyond the walls, there’s a small, durable watch keeping perfect time—and a life of freedom and expanding possibilities.

  • Always Be Closing: The Lie We Keep Buying

    Always Be Closing: The Lie We Keep Buying

    “Always be closing,” Alec Baldwin snarls in Glengarry Glen Ross, playing Blake, a blustering emissary of pure cortisol sent to terrify a roomful of salesmen into obedience. Closing, he tells them, is the only thing that matters. Not effort. Not integrity. Not sanity. Close or die. The line is famous because it taps into something already rotting inside us. We don’t just want to close deals; we want to close life. Getting married is a close. Deciding on a religion is a close. Graduating college is a close. Buying a house, buying a car, settling on a diet, hitting a goal weight—each one dangles the same promise: after this, I can rest. After this, I’ll be done.

    The culture worships closers. Closers are decisive. Closers have plans. Closers stride forward with laminated confidence. Closers collect ceremonies, milestones, certificates, and Instagram captions. Closing is marketed as maturity itself—the moment when uncertainty is evicted and order takes possession of the premises. Winners close. Losers waffle. That’s the myth.

    But closing is a con, and a lazy one at that. It sells the toddler fantasy of permanent comfort: arrive somewhere and stay arrived. Life, unfortunately, does not honor this contract. It leaks, mutates, backslides, and doubles back. I once knew a couple who were desperate to permanently break up with each other. So they got married as a strategy for divorce. They believed the divorce would provide closure—clean lines, sealed chapters, emotional foreclosure. Instead, they remarried. Then divorced again. Then they remarried. Then got another divorce. Closure didn’t show up. It never does. The story simply kept going, indifferent to their paperwork.

    The same lie infects consumer life. I know a man who believed salvation came in the shape of a Rolex Explorer. Ten thousand dollars later, he congratulated himself on having found his Exit Watch—the final piece, the closing bell. Within months, he was browsing watches that made the Rolex look like an appetizer. The watch didn’t close anything. It became a monument to the futility of the attempt.

    We love the idea of closing because we are exhausted—by the volatility of the world and the chaos inside our own skulls. “Always be closing” offers a fantasy of stillness, a promise that motion can end and anxiety can be put in storage. But it’s just another pressure pitch, no more real than the sales patter Mamet skewered. Life doesn’t close. It revises, reopens, and keeps charging interest. The only thing that truly closes is the sales pitch itself.

  • Why Men Can’t Stop Writing Manifestos

    Why Men Can’t Stop Writing Manifestos

    My wife has never been one to traffic in lazy generalizations about men and women, but a few years ago she offered one observation so sharp it lodged itself in my brain. Men, she said, have a peculiar itch that women conspicuously lack: the need to write a manifesto. Not a gentle essay about waking up early to tend tomatoes and eggplant while discovering the joys of fiber and self-care. No. A manifesto is something else entirely—a doctrinal collision, an absolutist thunderclap so brimming with rectitude, so certain of its own world-historical importance, that its author feels morally obligated to broadcast it to the four corners of the earth. Silence would be selfish. Restraint would be unethical.

    A manifesto, of course, cannot emerge from a vacuum. It requires a conversion story—preferably violent. The man was once lost, deformed, wandering in a fog of ignorance. Then something happened. The cosmos intervened. He was singled out. Enlightened. Charged with a mission. His truth, having been hard-won and privately revealed, must now be universalized. To keep it to himself would be a crime against humanity. Thus the manifesto is born: part gospel, part grievance, part personal branding exercise.

    My wife was not complimenting men. She was diagnosing a particular strain of virulent egotism—one that disguises itself as sincerity and moral urgency while quietly pursuing something else: control. To impose a worldview is to dominate. To dominate is to feel powerful. Strip away the rhetoric and you find that many manifestos are not about helping others live better lives but about arranging the world so it finally stops resisting the author’s will.

    Because many men will inevitably produce many manifestos, conflict follows. Doctrines metastasize. Defenses harden. Footnotes sprout like fortifications. Converts gather. Commentaries appear. Some commentaries become so influential they eclipse the original manifesto and establish themselves as superior, corrected versions. The ecosystem expands, competitive and self-referential, like an intellectual CrossFit gym where everyone is chasing the same leaderboard.

    What my wife was really saying, I think, is that men don’t create philosophies primarily to serve others. They create them the way athletes build muscle: to compete. A manifesto is intellectual athletics—grandstanding, bluster, and chest-thumping in paragraph form. It’s less a tool for understanding the world than a way to announce dominance within it.

    Here is my confession, one I may or may not share when my wife gets home tonight: I, too, feel the pull of the manifesto. The fantasy of a grand conversion, followed by the construction of a flawless, infallible system that explains everything, is intoxicating. But if I’m honest, what draws me to that fantasy isn’t egotism so much as fear. The world is a roiling swamp of ambiguity and uncertainty. A manifesto promises certainty on a silver platter, a pacifier for the anxious adult who wants the noise to stop.

    Perhaps my wife is right. Egotism may just be fear in a tuxedo. Men, for whatever reason—biology, culture, testosterone, self-loathing—seem especially adept at projecting their inner chaos onto the world and then mistrusting it for the mess they recognize in themselves. The manifesto becomes a coping mechanism, a way to simulate control in a reality that stubbornly refuses to cooperate.

    Women don’t write manifestos because a manifesto lectures. It talks down. It closes the case. Women talk instead. Life, as they seem to understand it, is an open court—conversation, improvisation, shared meaning, surprise, trust. Men, by contrast, barricade themselves inside doctrine, shout it through a megaphone, and grow indignant when no one salutes.

    When my wife gets home, I think I’ll abandon the manifesto project. I’ll try something riskier. I’ll start a conversation. I’ll listen.

  • Colonel Lockjaw and the Cosplay Watches of the Soul

    Colonel Lockjaw and the Cosplay Watches of the Soul

    If I had to confess to one of my worst flaws, it would be this: I’m a virtuoso at diagnosing other people’s defects and a coward when it comes to inspecting my own. I can spot hypocrisy at fifty paces, write a character analysis of your blind spots, and deliver a withering critique of your moral laziness—while remaining blissfully obtuse about the same diseases raging in me. It’s not insight. It’s evasion. Instead of interrogating my own failures, I distract myself by putting others on trial.

    The hypocrisy deepens because I despise people who refuse self-interrogation. Over the years I’ve kept my distance from plenty of them—friends, colleagues, acquaintances—because their lack of self-awareness felt repellent. I judged them for their blindness without noticing I was practicing the same sin with better vocabulary. My watch hobby was an early case study in this delusion. I spent years buying grotesquely oversized timepieces—wrist-mounted monuments to masculine cosplay. In my private fantasy, I was Sean Penn starring as Colonel Lockjaw. In reality, I was a middle-aged man dodging a mirror. Why confront a crisis of purpose when you can drop five hundred dollars on a costume watch and call it identity?

    Eventually I sobered up—sold the ridiculous pieces, learned what real watches are, and cleared out my collection the way a dieter purges Doritos and Twinkies. But the damage was done: I’d wasted three years of a hobby because I refused to ask what my compensation phase said about me. I demanded self-interrogation from everyone else. I granted myself a permanent exemption. Do as I say, not as I do—the oldest creed of the unexamined life.

    That failure has been haunting me lately, triggered by a memory from thirty-five years ago: an English Department meeting that turned into a circus. I was a young instructor, terrified of tenure committees and power hierarchies, sitting quietly while the veterans argued about whether personal narratives belonged in college writing. One professor—let’s call him Foghorn Leghorn—was a legendary drunk who showed up to meetings in a black leather bomber jacket and a cloud of whiskey fumes. With disheveled silver hair and black horn-rimmed glasses, he declared that personal narratives were “sissy” assignments and that students needed “real-life” skills like argument and analysis. Susan, a colleague with more backbone than the rest of us combined, said that autobiographical writing gave students something called “personal enrichment.” Foghorn exploded. “What the hell does that mean?” he barked. “Personal enrichment? What the hell does that mean?” Susan backed down—not because she was wrong, but because there’s no winning an argument with a belligerent man auditioning for his own demolition.

    Back then, I kept my mouth shut. I was young. I was a lecturer on a non-tenure track. I was scared. But in the decades since, I’ve had time to think about Susan’s phrase. Personal enrichment. What does it mean—and should I, as a writing teacher, care? The answer is yes, and yes again. Personal enrichment is the cultivation of skills no standardized test can measure: moral clarity, self-honesty, the courage to look at yourself without flinching. In other words, self-interrogation.

    I learned that lesson early in my career without knowing what to call it. Around the same time Foghorn was grandstanding, I assigned a definition essay on passive-aggressive behavior. Students had to begin with a brutal thesis—passive aggression as cowardly hostility—then unpack its traits and finish with a personal narrative. I wanted them to stop admiring dysfunction as cleverness. The best essay came from a nineteen-year-old whose beauty could’ve launched a sitcom. She wrote about her boyfriend, a man who looked like life had given up on him. He was unemployed, proudly unwashed, and permanently horizontal—camped in her parents’ living room like a hostile occupier. He drank her father’s beer, ate his food, parked himself in his chair, and stank up the furniture with equal enthusiasm. Her parents hated him. Especially her father. And that was the point.

    She resented her father’s authority, so she punished him the only way she knew how—by sabotaging herself. Romantic self-destruction as revenge. When we discussed the essay, she told me something I’ve never forgotten: writing it forced her to see her behavior with unbearable clarity. She kicked the boyfriend out. Then, clumsily but honestly, she confronted her father. A personal narrative—mocked by my alcoholic colleague—did what no grading rubric ever could. It changed a life.

    Fifteen years later, I assigned another narrative, this one inspired by Viktor Frankl’s Man’s Search for Meaning. I asked students to write about a moment when tragedy forced them to choose between self-pity and courage. The finest essay came from a young mother who’d been abandoned by her own mother at two years old. She grew up with a hole in her heart, then gave birth to a daughter and decided she would be the mother she never had. In loving her child, she learned to love herself. I’ve taught for nearly forty years. Her story has moved me more than anyone’s.

    That’s why I assign personal narratives more than ever. Not just because they resist AI shortcuts, but because they demand moral inventory. And here’s the final irony: Foghorn Leghorn—the loudest critic of self-examination—was the man who needed it most. Last I heard, he’d burned down his kitchen while making dinner, lost his family, and was holed up in a cheap hotel drinking himself toward oblivion. The mansplainer who sneered at Susan ended up a tragic footnote in his own cautionary tale. I hope he found sobriety. If he did, it began where it always does—with honest self-interrogation.

    As for me, I’ll keep assigning personal narratives. I’ll keep asking students to look inward with courage. And I’ll keep reminding myself that the hardest essays to write are not on the syllabus. They’re the ones you compose silently, about your own life, when no one is grading you.

  • Are We Extras in Someone Else’s Luxury Watch Fantasy?

    Are We Extras in Someone Else’s Luxury Watch Fantasy?

    Six weeks with my fifteen-year-old twins is a better sociology course than anything you’ll find at UCLA. Their generation runs on shared experiences—amusement parks, concerts, parties—and the sacred ritual of turning those moments into cinematic TikToks. They love empathy. They love energy drinks. They love boba with the devotion earlier civilizations reserved for gods. They exchange hugs so theatrical they deserve SAG cards. They also love not driving. Why would they? They have concierge parents for that. The car is not transportation; it’s a mobile confessional booth where they talk, text, and disappear into playlists like monks retreating into sonic monasteries. Licenses can wait. I’ll be stunned if either one pilots a vehicle solo before age twenty-five.

    They dress alike, too—hoodies, high-rise jeans, baggy sweatpants. When I pick them up from school, I scan a sea of identical silhouettes and play a grim game of Where’s Waldo: Daughter Edition. It’s like they all emerged from the same fashion assembly line, stamped and released in bulk.

    Then there’s the strangest quirk of all: the generational terror of bare feet. We live in Southern California, where flip-flops are a constitutional right. But when my daughters’ friends come over, I’m ordered—ordered—to put on shoes. Feet are not feet anymore. They’re “dogs,” “grippers,” “claws,” a traveling carnival of anatomical horror. One girl saw my bare feet and reported back like she’d witnessed a crime scene. Since then, I suit up like a hazmat worker whenever teenagers enter the house.

    Watching their collective likes and dislikes has turned me into an amateur René Girard scholar. Girard argued that we don’t want things because they’re intrinsically wonderful; we want them because the tribe wants them first. Desire is social plagiarism. The tribe writes the script, and we perform it thinking it’s improvisation.

    But there’s a dark twin to mimetic desire: mimetic aversion. If the tribe hates something, we learn to hate it, too—even if we never felt a flicker of disgust on our own. Case in point: “I saw your dad’s dogs. Gross.” A moral judgment delivered about toes.

    Naturally, this has sent my twenty-year watch obsession into a philosophical tailspin. When we crave a watch, is it a private passion—or just tribal ventriloquism? Are we collectors, or are we obedient extras in someone else’s luxury fantasy? And if we’re that easily programmed, doesn’t it expose something mildly humiliating about us—our insecurities, our hunger to belong, our weakness for social approval dressed up as taste?

    Maybe understanding desire would clarify us. Or maybe it would only prove how unclassifiable we really are. Some mysteries resist labels.

    Still, in the watch world, mimetic aversion is practically doctrine. Quartz watches are treated like dietary betrayal. You used to grill rib-eyes and now you’re flipping soy burgers? Next you’ll be wearing Crocs and asking for decaf. Show up at the wrong meet-up with a quartz on your wrist and you won’t just lose respect—you’ll lose invitations, subscribers, and possibly citizenship. “Quartz?” they’ll whisper. “Traitor.”

    On the flip side, mimetic desire runs the show just as ruthlessly. Look at the waiting lists. Look at the resale prices. When you buy certain watches, you’re not buying steel—you’re buying absolution. A Rolex Sub isn’t a timepiece; it’s a baptism. The tribe anoints you with holy water and hums a choral anthem over your wrist.

    So yes, the watch hobby is soaked in mimetic desire and mimetic aversion. But here’s my heresy: if you’re a true watch obsessive, those forces barely apply to you. Because your relationship with watches isn’t tribal. It’s theological.

    A real watch obsessive is ruled by three forces.

    First, the Svengali Effect. A certain watch doesn’t attract you—it hypnotizes you. It hijacks your agency like a charming cult leader. You try to resist. You fail. The watch plants itself in your brain and grows there like an invasive eucalyptus until surrender feels like destiny. This isn’t imitation. This is possession.

    Second, Horological Fixation. At this stage, your watch stops being a timekeeping device and becomes a visual narcotic. You no longer use your watch to check the time—you commune with the object. The world fades. The wrist becomes a shrine. Eden relocates to forty-two millimeters of brushed steel.

    Third, Horological Transfiguration. You put on the watch and—boom—you’re not just dressed, you’re transformed. James Bond. Jacques Cousteau. Brad Pitt walking into a bar where the jukebox automatically switches to something heroic. The watch doesn’t accessorize you; it authorizes you.

    I’ve known watch obsessives for decades. I know the symptoms. I know the tells.

    So if you live under the Svengali Effect, Horological Fixation, and Horological Transfiguration, René Girard’s mimetic theory doesn’t really apply. The good news: you’re not a phony lemming chasing tribal approval. The bad news: you’re completely unhinged.

    Congratulations. You’re a true watch obsessive—authentic, independent, gloriously insane.

    Now put on your watch. You’ve been Clark Kent long enough. It’s time to rip open the shirt and let the cape fly.

  • Notes from a Man Who Almost Quit

    Notes from a Man Who Almost Quit

    A couple of days ago I posted a video that wandered—cheerfully and without a map—through two connected ruins: the normalization of male anger among boys raised by furious fathers in the 1970s, and the era’s larger faith in the Cult of Self. The seventies didn’t just give us flared jeans and shag carpets; they gave us a theology in which personal desire was holy and self-fulfillment was the promised land. If it felt good, it must be true. If it felt restrictive, it must be oppression. The problem, of course, is that this gospel of indulgence didn’t liberate anyone. It detached people from reality—its dangers, its obligations, its stubborn insistence that meaning comes from service, not worship of the mirror. Happiness, in adult life, is a side effect of using your talents to serve others. In adolescent mythology, it’s supposed to arrive through nonstop self-adoration. One path leads to purpose. The other leads to addiction, loneliness, and a master class in self-inflicted insanity.

    I was nervous about posting the video because it rambled like a drunk uncle at Thanksgiving. Structurally, it was a mess. Spiritually, I loved making it. Instead of delivering a pinch-faced lecture, I told stories—about my younger days as a glutton disguised as a bodybuilder, an aspiring hedonist loitering with my surfer-bro friend, both of us chasing pleasure like it owed us money. To my surprise, the audience didn’t flinch. The comments came back warm. The themes—male anger, Boomer dislocation in a world that moved on without us, the tragic comedy of self-indulgence—landed. Apparently, people still have an appetite for conversations that don’t flatter them.

    What made the whole thing sweeter is that I had been flirting with the idea of quitting YouTube altogether. My excuse was noble-sounding: I’ve already said everything worth saying. But underneath that was a quieter truth—I was retreating. Folding inward. Slipping toward a comfortable, well-furnished silence. Then a louder voice cut in: Don’t confuse retirement with wisdom. Don’t confuse exhaustion with completion. The video became a small rebellion—my living self telling my future fossilized self to take a hike. Life won the argument.

    Now I face the classic writer’s hangover: the fear that I’ve set a standard I can’t meet again. After a piece feels honest, everything that follows looks trivial, trite, or terminally lame. But that fear is the job. Writing isn’t a vending machine that spits out brilliance on command. It’s excavation. You dig and dig and learn to tell the difference between ore and dirt. If you can’t live with that grind, you’ll anesthetize yourself with Netflix and hero sandwiches until despair arrives—far uglier than the honest struggle you tried to avoid. Creation is hard. Avoiding it is harder.

  • The Watch I Want vs. the Life I Actually Live

    The Watch I Want vs. the Life I Actually Live

    For the past month I’ve been circling the black titanium Citizen Attesa CC4055-65E the way a moth circles a very handsome, very unnecessary flame. It’s not even obscenely priced—roughly the cost of a Lenovo mini business PC with an Ultra 7—so my brain keeps pitching it as “reasonable.” I picture it on my wrist: sleek, dark, stealthy, broadcasting a silent message of confidence, competence, and maybe a little controlled menace. The fantasy version of me wears it everywhere. The honest version of me pauses and asks a less flattering question: where, exactly, am I going that requires this level of cinematic wrist presence?

    That’s when the self-audit begins. Would I really wear it, or would I merely own it—like one of those tasteful paintings people hang in their living rooms to prove they have a soul, then never look at again? But that analogy collapses on contact. A painting is for the wall. A watch is for the wrist. One is meant to be admired from across the room; the other is meant to live on your body, accumulating scuffs and stories. When I buy watches, what I’m really buying is a version of myself in motion—someone who leaves the house, enters public life, and performs a coherent aesthetic identity in the wild. The problem is that most days, I don’t need a public uniform. I need something comfortable while I work, run errands, and live in my own cave like a reasonably civilized hermit.

    That’s why my divers live on straps and not bracelets. Straps belong to real life—coffee runs, grocery aisles, desk time. Bracelets belong to fantasy life—the version of me who is being interviewed on late-night TV or starring in a tasteful indie film about male regret. Since those scenarios remain stubbornly fictional, the idea of strapping on a glossy black titanium showpiece starts to feel like costume drama. And here’s the punchline I can’t dodge: even if I became that public figure tomorrow, it wouldn’t make me happier or more whole. That life is a mirage. Which means the Citizen Attesa, for all its beauty, risks becoming one too—a chimera in black titanium, promising a transformation I no longer believe in.

  • No Backup World: Martin Hägglund, C.S. Lewis, and the Moral Urgency of Now

    No Backup World: Martin Hägglund, C.S. Lewis, and the Moral Urgency of Now

    Philosopher Martin Hägglund, in This Life: Secular Faith and Spiritual Freedom, advances a stark and unsettling claim: genuine goodness is impossible unless we accept that death is final. There is no afterlife to balance the books, no celestial extension cord supplying meaning from beyond the grave. This life—finite, fragile, irrevocable—is all we have. Faith in eternity, Hägglund argues, is not a comfort but a distraction, a metaphysical detour that siphons urgency away from the hard, unglamorous work of building justice here and now. To make his case, he turns to an unlikely witness: C.S. Lewis. In A Grief Observed, written after the death of his wife Joy Davidman, Lewis—Christian apologist, defender of heaven—finds his theology torn open by loss. Scripture offers no shelter. Promises of eternal reunion ring thin. Lewis admits to “bitter resentment,” to madness, to a grief so absolute that it flattens piety on contact. What he wants is not God, not eternity, not consolation—but Joy. Her absence exposes a truth Lewis cannot escape: the intensity of love is inseparable from its fragility. Love hurts because it can be lost. Its power comes from time running out. Hägglund presses the implication Lewis cannot fully accept: even if eternity existed, love could not survive there. With no stakes, no risk, no irreversibility, existence would congeal into something inert—an endless, consequence-free duration. Heaven, in this view, is not fulfillment but sedation. To imagine God as a valet who merely returns our loved ones to us is, for both Lewis and Hägglund, a form of idolatry. But where Lewis is torn—desperate to hold faith and grief in the same trembling hands—Hägglund feels no such strain. For him, religion does not deepen love; it dilutes it. It shifts responsibility elsewhere. It turns this world into a waiting room and this life into a rehearsal. Secular living, by contrast, is an act of commitment without backup plans. There is no “later” to fix what we neglect now. That is precisely why what we do here matters so much.

    If you are a political-sapien, this conclusion feels not bleak but bracing. History—not heaven—is where salvation must be worked out. There is no eternal kingdom hovering offstage, no divine reset button waiting beyond the clouds. This world is the only stage, and its outcomes depend on the quality of the institutions we build and maintain. Moral authority does not descend from above; it emerges from human reason struggling, imperfectly but persistently, toward fairness. People, in this view, are not saints or sinners by nature so much as products of systems—capable of decency when the scaffolding is sound, capable of cruelty when it is not. Politics therefore becomes the highest moral labor: not a sideshow to spiritual life but the arena in which justice either materializes or fails. AI machines enter this worldview as probationary instruments. They are not saviors and not demons. They earn trust only insofar as they distribute power downward, widen access, and reduce structural inequity. If AI flattens hierarchies and democratizes opportunity, it is a tool worth refining. If it concentrates wealth, authority, and decision-making into fewer hands, it ceases to be innovation and becomes a threat—something to regulate, constrain, or dismantle in defense of the only life that counts.

  • AI as Tool, Toy, or Idol: A Taxonomy of Belief

    AI as Tool, Toy, or Idol: A Taxonomy of Belief

    Your attitude toward AI machines is not primarily technical; it is theological—whether you admit it or not. Long before you form an opinion about prompts, models, or productivity gains, you have already decided what you believe about human nature, meaning, and salvation. That orientation quietly determines whether AI strikes you as a tool, a toy, or a temptation. There are three dominant postures.

    If you are a political-sapien, you believe history is the only stage that matters and justice is the closest thing we have to salvation. There is no eternal kingdom waiting in the wings; this world is the whole play, and it must be repaired with human hands. Divine law holds no authority here—only reason, negotiation, and evolving ethical frameworks shaped by shared notions of fairness. Humans, you believe, are essentially good if the scaffolding is sound. Build the right systems and decency will follow. Politics is not mere governance; it is moral engineering. AI machines, from this view, are tools on probation. If they democratize power, flatten hierarchies, and distribute wealth more equitably, they are allies. If they concentrate power, automate inequality, or deepen asymmetry, they are villains in need of constraint or dismantling.

    If you are a hedonist-sapien, you turn away from society’s moral drama and toward the sovereign self. The highest goods are pleasure, freedom, and self-actualization. Politics is background noise; transcendence is unnecessary. Life is about feeling good, living well, and removing friction wherever possible. AI machines arrive not as a problem but as a gift—tools that streamline consumption, curate taste, and optimize comfort. They promise a smoother, more luxurious life with fewer obstacles and more options. Of the three orientations, the hedonist-sapien embraces AI with the least hesitation and the widest grin, welcoming it as the ultimate personal assistant in the lifelong project of maximizing pleasure and minimizing inconvenience.

    If you are a devotional-sapien, you begin with a darker diagnosis. Humanity is fallen, and no amount of policy reform, pleasure, or purchasing power can make it whole. You don’t expect salvation from governments, markets, or optimization schemes; you expect it only from your Maker. You may share the political-sapien’s concern for justice and enjoy the hedonist-sapien’s creature comforts, but you refuse to confuse either with redemption. You are not shopping for happiness; you are seeking restoration. Spiritual health—not efficiency—is the measure that matters. From this vantage, AI machines look less like neutral tools and more like idols-in-training: shiny substitutes promising mastery, insight, or transcendence without repentance or grace. Unsurprisingly, the devotional-sapien is the most skeptical of AI’s expanding role in human life.

    Because your orientation shapes what you think humans need most—justice, pleasure, or redemption—it also shapes how you use AI, how much you trust it, and what you expect it to deliver. Before asking what AI can do for you, it is worth asking a more dangerous question: what are you secretly hoping it will save you from?