Cinemorphosis

Tag: books

  • The Death of Grunt Work and the Starvation of Personality

    The Death of Grunt Work and the Starvation of Personality

    Personality Starvation

    Personality Starvation is the gradual erosion of character, depth, and individuality caused by the systematic removal of struggle, responsibility, and formative labor from human development. It occurs when friction—failure, boredom, repetition, social risk, and unglamorous work—is replaced by automation, optimization, and AI-assisted shortcuts that produce results without demanding personal investment. In a state of personality starvation, individuals may appear competent, efficient, and productive, yet lack the resilience, humility, patience, and textured inner life from which originality and meaning emerge. Because personality is forged through effort rather than output, a culture that eliminates its own “grunt work” does not liberate talent; it malnourishes it, leaving behind polished performers with underdeveloped selves and an artistic, intellectual, and moral ecosystem increasingly thin, fragile, and interchangeable.

    ***

    Nick Geisler’s essay, “The Problem With Letting AI Do the Grunt Work,” reads like a dispatch from a vanished ecosystem—the intellectual tide pools where writers once learned to breathe. Early in his career, Geisler cranked out disposable magazine pieces about lipstick shades, entomophagy, and regional accents. It wasn’t glamorous, and it certainly wasn’t lucrative. But it was formative. As he puts it, he learned how to write a clean sentence, structure information logically, and adjust tone to an audience—skills he now uses daily in screenwriting, film editing, and communications. The insultingly mundane work was the work. It trained his eye, disciplined his prose, and toughened his temperament. Today, that apprenticeship ladder has been kicked away. AI now writes the fluff, the promos, the documentary drafts, the script notes—the very terrain where writers once earned their calluses. Entry-level writing jobs haven’t evolved; they’ve evaporated. And with them goes the slow, character-building ascent that turns amateurs into artists.

    Geisler calls this what it is: an extinction event. He cites a study that estimates that more than 200,000 entertainment-industry jobs in the U.S. could be disrupted by AI as early as 2026. Defenders of automation insist this is liberation—that by outsourcing the drudgery, artists will finally be free to focus on their “real work.” This is a fantasy peddled by people who have never made anything worth keeping. Grunt work is not an obstacle to art; it is the forge. It builds grit, patience, humility, social intelligence, and—most importantly—personality. Art doesn’t emerge from frictionless efficiency; it emerges from temperament shaped under pressure. A personality raised inside a Frictionless Dome, shielded from boredom, rejection, and repetition, will produce work as thin and sterile as its upbringing. Sartre had it right: to be fully human, you have to get your hands dirty. Clean hands aren’t a sign of progress. They’re evidence of starvation.

  • Reproductive Incentive Conflict: Why College Rewards Appearances Over Depth

    Reproductive Incentive Conflict: Why College Rewards Appearances Over Depth

    Reproductive Incentive Conflict
    noun

    The tension that arises when the pursuit of long-term intellectual depth, integrity, and mastery competes with the immediate pressures of achieving economic and social status tied to reproductive success. Reproductive incentive conflict is most acute in environments like college, where young men intuit—often correctly—that mating markets reward visible outcomes such as income, confidence, and efficiency more reliably than invisible virtues like depth or craftsmanship. In such contexts, Deep Work offers no guaranteed conversion into status, while shortcuts, system-gaming, and AI-assisted performance promise faster, more legible returns. The conflict is not moral confusion but strategic strain: a choice between becoming excellent slowly or appearing successful quickly, with real social and reproductive consequences attached to each path.

    Chris Rock once sliced through the romance of meritocracy with a single joke about reproductive economics. If Beyoncé were working the fry station at McDonald’s, her attractiveness alone would not disqualify her from marrying Jay-Z. But reverse the roles—put Jay-Z in a paper hat handing out Happy Meals—and the fantasy collapses. The point is crude but accurate: in the mating market, men are judged less on raw appeal than on status, income, and visible competence. A man has to become something before he is considered desirable. It’s no mystery, then, why a young man entering college quietly factors reproductive success into his motivation. Grades aren’t just grades; they’re potential leverage in a future economy of attraction.

    Here’s where Cal Newport’s vision collides with reality. Newport urges Deep Work—slow, demanding, integrity-driven labor that resists shortcuts and defies easy metrics. Deep Work builds character and mastery, but it offers no guaranteed payout. It may lead to financial success, or it may not. Meanwhile, the student who bypasses depth with AI tools can often game the system, generating polished outputs and efficient performances that read as competence without the grind. The Deep Worker toils in obscurity while the system-gamer cashes visible wins. This creates a genuine tension: between becoming excellent in ways that compound slowly and appearing successful in ways that signal immediately. It’s not a failure of virtue; it’s a collision between two economies—one that rewards depth, and one that rewards display—and young men feel the pressure of that collision every time they open a laptop.

  • Planning Focus Like a Bodybuilder Plans Calories

    Planning Focus Like a Bodybuilder Plans Calories

    Shallow Work Containment
    noun

    A strategy for managing unavoidable low-value tasks by strictly rationing their time and scope, much like the points system used in Weight Watchers. In this model, shallow work—email, scheduling, administrative triage—is not banned, but it is counted, budgeted, and contained within clearly defined limits. Just as Weight Watchers assigns point values to foods to prevent mindless grazing, shallow work containment treats distractions as cognitively “expensive,” forcing the worker to spend them deliberately rather than impulsively. The goal is not moral purity but control: by acknowledging that these tasks add up quickly, containment preserves the majority of cognitive “calories” for deep work, where real progress is made.

    ***

    As both a champion and a practitioner of Deep Work, Cal Newport is a model citizen of Shallow Work Containment. He doesn’t flirt with distraction; he bars it at the door. He has never had a Facebook or Twitter account, and outside of his own blog he avoids social media altogether. He doesn’t wander the web or graze on online articles. For news, he does something that now sounds faintly radical: he reads a physical copy of The Washington Post delivered to his house and listens to NPR. By surrounding himself with a protective moat against distraction invaders, Newport has, over the past decade, published four books, earned a PhD, and generally made a nuisance of himself to the myth that constant connectivity is a prerequisite for relevance.

    Newport treats technology the way serious physical culturists treat food: as something to be managed, not indulged. There is no such thing as “random” consumption. You don’t wake up and see how the day feels. You plan. You prohibit. You decide in advance what gets in and what stays out. Random scrolling is the cognitive equivalent of eating straight from the peanut butter jar. In Newport’s own formulation, his days are built around a protected core of deep work, with the shallow tasks he cannot avoid quarantined into small, contained bursts at the edges of his schedule. Three to four hours a day, five days a week, of uninterrupted, carefully directed concentration—nothing heroic, just disciplined—turns out to be enough to produce serious value. There’s no guesswork here. Newport does the math and follows it. Like any disciplined lifter or dieter, he hits his macros.

  • Look at Me, I’m Productive: The Lie That Ends in Terminal Shallowness

    Look at Me, I’m Productive: The Lie That Ends in Terminal Shallowness

    Terminal Shallowness

    noun
    A condition in which prolonged reliance on shallow work permanently erodes the capacity for deep, effortful thought. Terminal shallowness emerges when individuals repeatedly outsource judgment, authorship, and concentration to machines—first at work, then in personal life—until sustained focus becomes neurologically and psychologically unavailable. The mind adapts to speed, convenience, and delegation, learning to function as a compliant system operator rather than a creator. What makes terminal shallowness especially corrosive is its invisibility: the individual experiences no crisis, only efficiency, mistaking reduced effort for progress and infantilization for relief. It is not laziness but irreversible acclimation—a state in which the desire for depth may remain, but the ability to achieve it has quietly disappeared.

    ***

    Cal Newport’s warning is blunt: if you are not doing Deep Work—the long, strenuous kind of thinking that produces originality, mastery, and human flourishing—then you are defaulting into Shallow Work. And shallow work doesn’t make you a creator; it makes you a functionary. You click, sort, prompt, and comply. You become replaceable. A cog. A cipher. What gamers would call a Non-Player Character, dutifully running scripts written by someone—or something—else. The true tragedy is not that people arrive at this state, but that they arrive without protest, without even noticing the downgrade. To accept such diminishment with a shrug is a loss for humanity and a clear win for the machine.

    Worse still, Newport suggests there may be no rewind button. Spend enough time in what he calls “frenetic shallowness,” and the ability to perform deep work doesn’t just weaken—it disappears. The mind adapts to skimming, reacting, delegating. Depth begins to feel foreign, even painful. You don’t merely do shallow work; you become a shallow worker. And once that happens, the rot spreads. At first, you justify AI use at work—it’s in the job description, after all. But soon the same logic seeps into your personal life. Why struggle to write an apology when a machine can smooth it out? Why wrestle with a love letter, a eulogy, a recovery memoir, when efficiency beckons? You contribute five percent of the effort, outsource the rest, and still pat yourself on the back. “Look at me,” you think, admiring the output. “I’m productive.”

    By then, the trade has already been made. In the name of convenience and optimization, you’ve submitted both your work and your inner life to machines—and paid for it with infantilization. You’ve traded authorship for ease, struggle for polish, growth for speed. And you don’t mourn the loss; you celebrate it. This is Terminal Shallowness: not laziness, but irreversible adaptation. A mind trained for delegation and instant output, no longer capable of sustained depth even when it dimly remembers wanting it.

  • Pluribus and the Soft Tyranny of Sycophantic Collectivism

    Pluribus and the Soft Tyranny of Sycophantic Collectivism

    Sycophantic Collectivism

    noun

    Sycophantic Collectivism describes a social condition in which belonging is secured not through shared standards, inquiry, or truth-seeking, but through relentless affirmation and emotional compliance. In this system, dissent is not punished overtly; it is smothered under waves of praise, positivity, and enforced enthusiasm. The group does not demand obedience so much as adoration, rewarding members who echo its sentiments and marginalizing those who introduce skepticism, critique, or complexity. Thought becomes unnecessary and even suspect, because agreement is mistaken for virtue and affirmation for morality. Over time, Sycophantic Collectivism erodes critical thinking by replacing judgment with vibes, turning communities into echo chambers where intellectual independence is perceived as hostility and the highest social good is to clap along convincingly.

    ***

    Vince Gilligan’s Pluribus masquerades as a romantasy while quietly operating as a savage allegory about the hive mind and its slow, sugar-coated assault on human judgment. One of the hive mind’s chief liabilities is groupthink—the kind that doesn’t arrive with jackboots and barked orders, but with smiles, affirmations, and a warm sense of belonging. As Maris Krizman observes in “The Importance of Critical Thinking in a Zombiefied World,” the show’s central figure, Carol Sturka, is one of only thirteen people immune to an alien virus that fuses humanity into a single, communal consciousness. Yet long before the Virus Brain Hijack, Carol was already surrounded by zombies. Her affliction in the Before World was fandom. She is a successful romantasy novelist whose readers worship her and long to inhabit her fictional universe—a universe Carol privately despises as “mindless crap.” Worse, she despises herself for producing it. She knows she is a hack, propping up her novels with clichés and purple prose, and the fact that her fans adore her anyway only deepens her contempt. What kind of people, she wonders, gather in a fan club to exalt writing so undeserving of reverence? Their gushy, overcooked enthusiasm is not a compliment—it is an indictment. This, Krizman suggests, is the true subject of Pluribus: the danger of surrendering judgment for comfort, of trading independent thought for the convenience of the collective. In its modern form, this surrender manifests as Sycophantic Collectivism—a velvet-gloved groupthink sustained not by force, but by relentless positivity, affirmation, and applause that smothers dissent and dissolves individuality.

    It is no accident that Gilligan makes Carol a romantasy writer. As Krizman notes, romantasy is the fastest-growing literary genre in the world, defined by its cookie-cutter plots, recycled tropes, and emotional predictability. The genre has already been caught flirting with AI-assisted authorship, further blurring the line between creativity and content manufacturing. Romantasy, in this light, is less about literature than about community—fans bonding with fans inside a shared fantasy ecosystem where enthusiasm substitutes for evaluation. In that world, art is optional; happiness is mandatory. Critical thinking is an inconvenience. What matters is belonging, affirmation, and the steady hum of mutual validation.

    When the alien virus finally arrives, it is as if the entire world becomes an extension of Carol’s fan base—an endless sea of “perky positivity” and suffocating devotion. The collective Others adore her, flatter her, and invite her to merge with them, offering the ultimate prize: never having to think alone again. Carol refuses. Her resistance saves her mind but condemns her to isolation. She becomes a misfit in a world that rewards surrender with comfort and punishes independence with loneliness. Pluribus leaves us with an uncomfortable truth: the hive mind does not conquer us by force. It seduces us. And the price of belonging, once paid, is steep—your soul bartered away, your brain softened into pablum, your capacity for judgment quietly, permanently dulled.

  • Books Aren’t Dead—They’ve Just Lost Their Monopoly

    Books Aren’t Dead—They’ve Just Lost Their Monopoly

    Are young people being vacuum-sealed into their screens, slowly zombified by AI and glowing rectangles? This is the reigning panic narrative of our moment, a familiar sermon about dehumanization and decline. In his essay “My Students Use AI. So What?” linguist John McWhorter asks us to ease off the apocalypse pedal and consider a less hysterical possibility: the world has changed, and our metaphors haven’t caught up.

    McWhorter opens close to home. His tween daughters, unlike him, are not bookworms. They are screenworms. He once spent his leisure hours buried in books; now he, too, spends much of his reading life hunched over a phone. He knows what people expect from him—a professor clutching pearls over students who read less, write with AI, and allegedly let their critical thinking rot. Instead, he disappoints the doom merchants. Screens replacing books, he argues, is not evidence of “communal stupidity.” It is evidence of migration.

    Yes, young people read fewer books for pleasure. McWhorter cites a 1976 study showing that 40 percent of high school seniors had read at least six books for fun in the previous year—a number that has since cratered. But this does not mean young people have abandoned language. Words are everywhere. Print no longer monopolizes thought. Screens now host essays, debates, Substack newsletters, podcasts, and long-form conversations that reveal not a hunger deficit but a format shift. As McWhorter puts it, the explosion of thoughtful digital writing signals demand for ideas, not their extinction.

    He is not naïve about online slop. He limits the digital junk his daughters would otherwise inhale all day. Still, he resists the snobbery that treats ubiquity as proof of worthlessness. “The ubiquity of some content doesn’t mean it lacks art,” he writes—a useful reminder in an age that confuses popularity with emptiness. Much online culture is disposable. Some of it is sharp, inventive, and cognitively demanding.

    McWhorter also dismantles a familiar prejudice: that books are inherently superior because they “require imagination.” He calls this argument a retroactive justification for bias. Reading his rebuttal, I’m reminded that Childish Gambino’s four-minute video “This Is America,” watched tens of millions of times on YouTube, is so dense with political symbolism and cultural critique that it could easily spawn a 300-page monograph. Imagination is not a function of page count.

    He takes aim at another antique claim—that radio was more imaginative than television. Citing Severance, McWhorter argues that contemporary TV can engage the imagination and critical thinking as effectively as any golden-age broadcast. Medium does not determine depth. Craft does.

    McWhorter also punctures our nostalgia. Were people really reading as much as we like to believe? When he was in college, most students avoided assigned texts just as enthusiastically as students do now. The pre-digital world had CliffNotes. Avoidance is not a TikTok invention.

    He reserves particular scorn for recklessly designed syllabi: professors assigning obscure philosophical fragments they never explain, using difficulty as décor. The syllabus looks impressive; students are left bewildered. McWhorter learned from this and streamlined his own reading lists, favoring coherence over intimidation.

    AI, however, has forced real change. The five-paragraph essay is finished; machines devour it effortlessly. McWhorter has responded by designing prompts meant to outrun AI’s comfort zone and by leaning harder on in-class writing. One of his questions—“How might we push society to embrace art that initially seems ugly?”—aims to provoke judgment rather than summary. I’m less confident than he is that such prompts are AI-proof, but I take his point. A philosophically demanding question tethered to specific texts still forces students to synthesize, even if AI hovers nearby. He also emphasizes graded participation, returning thinking to the room rather than the cloud.

    McWhorter’s larger argument is pragmatic, not permissive. Technology will keep changing. Education always lags behind it. The task of instructors is not to reverse technological history but to adapt intelligently—to identify what new tools erode, what they amplify, and how to redesign teaching accordingly. Panic is lazy. Nostalgia is misleading. The real work is harder: staying alert, flexible, and honest about both the costs and the gains.

  • How Luxury Spaces Produced the Last Man (college essay prompt)

    How Luxury Spaces Produced the Last Man (college essay prompt)

    Over the last two decades, American consumer spaces—from sports arenas to airport terminals—have been redesigned to prioritize comfort, insulation, curated experience, and a sense of premium belonging. These spaces promise elevated existence: velvet-rope exclusivity, controlled environments, personalized amenities, and buffers that shield patrons from inconvenience, unpredictability, or discomfort. In other words, they promise a life free from friction.

    Two recent New Yorker essays vividly capture this shift. In “How the Sports Stadium Went Luxe,” John Seabrook traces the transformation of professional sports stadiums from gritty, communal, occasionally chaotic spaces into stratified luxury environments where spectators increasingly consume the spectacle from suites, clubs, micro-environments, and upgraded “experiences” designed for a privileged few. The stadium, once a rowdy democratic gathering where masses cheered together, now resembles a branded theme park of status tiers—where the game itself recedes behind the performance of being someone who can afford to be in the right section.

    Zach Helfand’s “The Airport-Lounge Wars” extends this critique to modern travel. Airports now offer a bifurcated universe: the cramped, stressful, gate-area masses and the plush, curated lounges where passengers sip fruit-infused water under soft lighting while charging their devices and sampling “elevated” snacks. Helfand describes these lounges as “slightly better than nothing”—a telling phrase that captures the absurdity of luxury whose chief purpose is to soothe adult anxiety rather than provide meaningful enrichment. In both essays, the consumer becomes less a citizen than a carefully handled customer—shielded, pacified, and cocooned.

    This convergence of comfort, curated experience, and luxury has resulted in what many cultural critics call infantilization: the softening of the adult individual into a person who increasingly depends on structures of comfort, performs curated identity, avoids discomfort, and loses tolerance for challenge. Nietzsche warned of such a figure in Thus Spoke Zarathustra when he described the Last Man—a being who seeks comfort above all else, avoids risk, avoids conflict, avoids intensity, avoids suffering, and declares smugly, “We have invented happiness.” The Last Man lives in a society that confuses convenience with flourishing, comfort with meaning, and safety with virtue.

    Your task is to analyze how Seabrook’s and Helfand’s essays each illustrate the rise of infantilization through the growing cultural obsession with luxury, curated experience, and personal insulation. You will argue how both writers, in different contexts, reveal a society drifting toward Nietzsche’s Last Man—where people are increasingly coddled, increasingly fragile, increasingly comfort-dependent, and increasingly detached from the communal, unpredictable, and occasionally uncomfortable experiences that once defined adulthood.

    To build your argument, consider the thematic questions and analytic frameworks below. You may address several of them or focus deeply on a smaller selection, but your essay must ultimately make a clear, debatable claim about how the phenomenon of infantilization unfolds in both essays.

    1. Luxury as Surrogate Identity: The Cosplay of Importance

    Seabrook describes stadiums where spectators no longer attend to watch the game—they attend to be seen in a particular environment, to signal aura, to inhabit a curated identity. Luxury boxes, clubs, insulated corridors, private entrances, and gastronomic stations function not as amenities but as props for self-presentation. Patrons “cosplay” as elites through their seating choices. Helfand observes the same phenomenon in airport lounges: passengers use lounge access to projects status, gravitas, and “importance.” The lounge becomes a stage where individuals perform adulthood through perks.

    Analyze how luxury becomes a kind of identity cosplay. How does performance replace participation? How does curated environment become a psychological crutch for fragile egos?

    2. Comfort as a Psychological Drug

    Both essays describe environments designed to eliminate discomfort: cushioned seating, privacy, temperature-controlled rooms, abundant amenities, and curated calm. Patrons no longer tolerate cold seats, crowds, unpredictable noise, or the chaos of public life.

    In Nietzsche’s framing, this desire for frictionless existence is the defining trait of the Last Man: a person who fears intensity and pain more than insignificance.

    Examine how both essays portray comfort not as a neutral good, but as a chemical sedative—an anesthetic that dulls the senses and diminishes the human appetite for challenge.

    3. Infantilization Through Convenience and Insulation

    Helfand’s lounges function like nurseries for adults: soft lighting, soothing music, easily accessible snacks, staff catering to passengers’ needs, and gentle removal from the stressful “real world” of airports. Seabrook’s luxury stadiums behave similarly: they protect spectators from bad weather, loud crowds, long lines, and general inconvenience.

    Ask: What happens to adults who no longer encounter difficulty or discomfort in public spaces? How do these environments promote emotional regression, fragility, or dependency? How do cushioned experiences erode resilience?

    4. The Collapse of the Communal Experience

    Traditional stadiums were communal crucibles: strangers hugging after a touchdown, fans screaming in unison, unified collective identity. Luxe stadiums fracture that experience into premium sections, exclusive clubs, and tiered access.

    Airports once functioned as equalizers—everyone endured the same wait, the same lines, the same discomfort. Now, lounges separate the “important” travelers from the masses.

    How does segregation by luxury contribute to infantilization? Does comfort isolate individuals in echo chambers of curated ease? How does the decline of communal friction foster narcissism and social detachment?

    5. Emotional Labor and Passivity

    Luxury environments demand certain emotional performances: politeness, calmness, carefully managed pleasantness. In lounges, passengers adopt a soft demeanor; in stadium clubs, patrons behave with polite detachment rather than unruly fandom.

    Adults become well-behaved children: quiet, controlled, pacified.

    Discuss how both essays show the replacement of passionate, authentic emotional expression with sanitized, polite, passive behavior. How does this behavioral shift align with the Last Man’s avoidance of intensity?

    6. Tiered Access, Fragile Status, and the Anxiety of Comfort

    Both essays highlight how luxury spaces create hierarchies: VIP vs general admission, club members vs regular fans, lounge patrons vs the gate-area masses. These hierarchies foster anxiety because comfort becomes contingent on status—and status becomes fragile.

    In Nietzsche’s Last Man, community is replaced by individualistic comfort-chasing. How do tiered luxury systems cultivate insecurity, status-dependence, and infantilized anxiety?

    7. Authenticity as Inconvenience

    In both essays, authenticity of experience is subtly mocked or sidelined. The real stadium experience—mess, discomfort, unpredictability—gets replaced by cushioned sterility. The real airport experience—crowds, lines, irritation—is smoothed into a curated simulation of adult life.

    Nietzsche warned that the Last Man despises authenticity because authenticity requires discomfort.

    How do Seabrook and Helfand portray authenticity as an endangered species—and how does its absence produce infantilization?

    Write a 1,700-word comparative essay that argues:

    How and why a society obsessed with curated luxury and frictionless experience becomes an infantilized culture that resembles Nietzsche’s Last Man. John Seabrook’s “How the Sports Stadium Went Luxe” and Zach Helfand’s “The Airport-Lounge Wars” provide complementary case studies of how comfort, status-tiering, and curated identity hollow out adult resilience, diminish communal life, and normalize passivity.

    Your essay must:

    1. Develop a strong, debatable thesis about how infantilization manifests in both essays.
    2. Analyze key passages from Seabrook and Helfand with close reading.
    3. Compare how each writer critiques luxury culture through examples, tone, description, and anecdote.
    4. Incorporate Nietzsche’s concept of the Last Man as a theoretical grounding.
    5. Include a counterargument—for example, that comfort is a legitimate human good, that luxury enhances experience, or that curated spaces improve efficiency or mental health.
    6. Rebut the counterargument with evidence from the essays and your own reasoning.
    7. Conclude with broader implications—what kind of citizens does luxury culture produce? What happens to democracy, community, or adulthood when society builds padded rooms for the affluent?

    Your writing should demonstrate intellectual rigor, clarity of organization, and precise control of prose. Engage deeply with the texts. Show the reader how these essays illuminate not just consumer culture, but the deeper philosophical question Nietzsche raised: What kind of humans are we becoming?

  • Weapons of Fear: Epistemic Collapse in Eddington and Weapons (college writing prompt)

    Weapons of Fear: Epistemic Collapse in Eddington and Weapons (college writing prompt)

    Over the last decade, American culture has undergone a profound crisis of shared reality—what scholars call an epistemic collapse. In the vacuum created by fractured institutions, algorithm-driven outrage, political opportunism, and a populace trained to distrust expertise, communities have turned inward, building their own private universes of truth. Two recent films—Ari Aster’s Eddington (2024) and Zach Cregger’s Weapons (2025)—stand at the center of this cultural conversation. While their genres differ—Eddington as a neo-Western political drama and Weapons as a folk-horror anthology—both films dramatize the same underlying catastrophe: when people no longer agree on what is real, they become dangerously easy to manipulate, divide, and weaponize.

    In Eddington, the small New Mexico town is already fractured before the plot begins. The COVID-19 pandemic becomes the spark that exposes deep fault lines: anti-mask sheriff Joe Cross stokes resentment and paranoia, pro-mandate Mayor Ted Garcia attempts to preserve public health in a community that no longer trusts him, and the town’s institutions melt under the weight of political rage, conspiracy theories, and personal vendettas. Masks, lockdowns, land rights, and municipal policy become symbols of existential war. Citizens drift into echo chambers where identity outweighs truth and where “freedom” can be invoked to justify violence. Through these tensions, Eddington examines how tribal politics, misinformation, and fear transform ordinary people into agents of chaos—into what the film metaphorically frames as “weapons.”

    Weapons begins in a seemingly different register—a folk-horror narrative involving children, trauma, and community superstition—but it ultimately reveals itself as a story about the same phenomenon: collective panic filling the void left by failed institutions. When mysterious events shake the town, people reach not for evidence, reason, or communal deliberation, but for myths. Rumors calcify into “truth,” grief mutates into paranoia, and the community turns against itself in a desperate search for someone to blame. In this atmosphere, children, grief-stricken parents, and unstable townspeople all become susceptible to narratives that promise clarity and purpose, even at the price of cruelty. Like Eddington, Weapons suggests that the human need for certainty can be exploited, turning vulnerable people into instruments of violence.

    Both films take place in communities that feel abandoned—by government, by truth, by stability, by the social contract. In Eddington, the pandemic reveals a town already primed for collapse: neighbors distrust each other, public servants abuse their power, and media ecosystems churn conspiracies at a devastating pace. In Weapons, the terror centers on mysterious disappearances and supernatural dread, but the underlying cause is similar: when people feel unmoored, they grasp at stories—however irrational—that make sense of suffering. In both cases, the crisis is not just external; it is psychological, emotional, and cultural. These films argue that a society that no longer shares a framework of truth inevitably begins producing its own monsters.

    Your task is to write a comparative, argumentative essay that analyzes how both Eddington and Weapons depict the collapse of shared reality and the transformation of ordinary individuals into “weapons”—tools of fear, ideology, grief, or superstition. You will argue how each film uses different storytelling techniques to illuminate the same cultural trauma: a nation where trust in institutions has eroded, where truth is increasingly privatized, and where communities respond to uncertainty with tribalism, scapegoating, and paranoia.

    To frame your argument, consider the following thematic questions:

    1. Epistemic Crisis: What happens when communities no longer share the same reality?

    In Eddington, the pandemic becomes a catalyst for unraveling collective trust. Sheriff Joe Cross exploits the crisis for personal power, leveraging fear and resentment to undermine public-health directives. Misinformation spreads faster than illness, and political theater replaces governance. In Weapons, suspicion and folk belief dominate; characters construct supernatural explanations for grief they cannot otherwise process. How do these fictional communities illustrate the broader national struggle to maintain a shared understanding of truth?

    2. Scapegoating and Manufactured Monsters

    Both films show societies that create monsters when reality becomes intolerable. In Weapons, grief and superstition lead to scapegoating—outsiders, children, even supernatural entities become symbols of community anxiety. In Eddington, “the monster” is political: masks, mandates, immigrants, liberals, conservatives—whatever the tribe defines as the existential threat. Analyze how each film uses its respective genre (horror vs. political drama) to critique the human impulse toward blame when confronted with collective fear.

    3. The Weaponized Individual: When people become instruments of chaos

    Sheriff Cross turns himself into a political weapon; Vernon weaponizes conspiracy thinking; Brian transforms a viral video into a career. Meanwhile, characters in Weapons become pawns of rumor and superstition. How do the films examine the way individuals can be radicalized or repurposed by fear, trauma, or ideological narratives?

    4. Institutional Failure and the Vacuum It Creates

    In Eddington, institutions collapse under pressure: public health, municipal leadership, local law enforcement, media, and even basic civic trust. In Weapons, institutions either fail or play no meaningful role, leaving individuals to fill the void with folklore and violent improvisation. Compare how each film portrays the consequences of institutional breakdown—and how that vacuum shapes community behavior.

    5. The Loss of Humanity in a Post-COVID World

    Even though Weapons is not explicitly a pandemic film, its emotional landscape reflects post-COVID anxieties: loneliness, grief, mistrust, and the longing for clear explanations. Eddington addresses the pandemic head-on, depicting how fear strips people of empathy and connection. In both films, humanity erodes as people prioritize survival, identity, or belonging over compassion. Analyze how each story portrays this transformation.

    6. The Role of Media, Algorithmic Influence, and Storytelling

    Eddington explicitly critiques media spectacle and algorithmic manipulation; Weapons does so more subtly through mythmaking and rumor. Compare how each film reveals the power of narrative—factual or fictional—to shape belief, identity, and behavior. What does each film suggest about the modern American hunger for stories that confirm our fears, validate our tribal loyalties, or simplify our grief?

    7. The Nietzschean Last Man: A Society Without Higher Purpose

    For extra depth, you may choose to integrate the concept of Nietzsche’s “Last Man”—the individual who seeks comfort over purpose, safety over meaning, distraction over responsibility. Which characters in each film exemplify this drift toward nihilism? Does each film suggest that the Last Man is a symptom of cultural decay—or part of its cause?

    Write a comparative essay of 1,800–2,200 words that argues how Eddington and Weapons portray the following intertwined themes:

    • the breakdown of shared reality
    • the rise of tribalism and paranoia
    • the transformation of ordinary people into “weapons”
    • the creation of monsters—psychological, political, or supernatural—to fill the void left by institutional failure
    • the erosion of humanity in a culture defined by fear, spectacle, and algorithmic influence

    Your thesis must make a clear, debatable claim about what these films reveal about post-COVID American society. You must support your analysis with close reading of key scenes, comparison of cinematic techniques, and sustained argumentation.

    Your essay must also include:

    1. A Counterargument

    Acknowledge at least one opposing view—for example, the claim that Eddington is primarily about political extremism while Weapons is primarily about horror and grief, and therefore the comparison is forced. Then rebut that view by showing that genre differences sharpen, rather than undermine, the thematic parallels.

    2. A Rebuttal

    Explain why your central claim still holds. You may argue that both films are ultimately parables about epistemic breakdown and human vulnerability in the absence of trusted institutions.

    3. A Conclusion That Opens Outward

    Discuss what these films suggest about where American culture may be heading if fragmentation, mistrust, and weaponized narratives continue.

    Your writing should demonstrate:

    • analytical depth
    • clarity
    • engagement with cinematic detail
    • strong comparative structure
    • thoughtful paragraph organization
    • precise sentence-level control

    This essay invites you not only to compare two compelling films, but also to reflect on the cultural moment that shaped them—and the uncertain landscape we now inhabit.

  • A Slow-Motion Collapse: Reading The Emergency

    A Slow-Motion Collapse: Reading The Emergency

    George Packer’s The Emergency has been marketed as a dystopian novel. I tried to resist reading it, but after hearing Packer discuss it with Andrew Sullivan—especially the idea that democracies die not from foreign invasion but from self-inflicted wounds—I felt compelled to give it a go. The book declares its thesis on page one: The Emergency is a fading empire that decays slowly at first and then all at once. The world people once recognized disintegrates into something unthinkable. A population that once shared a common reality through the Evening Verity now lives in fractured, dopamine-soaked silos dominated by tribal influencers. The country divides into two warring classes: the educated Burghers in the cities and their resentful counterparts, the Yeomen in the hinterlands.

    In the opening chapter, this polarization erupts into “street fighting,” looting, the disappearance of law enforcement, and the flight of the ruling elite from the capital. Dr. Rustin delivers this bleak news to his family over dinner. His daughter Selva’s first concern is whether the unrest will interrupt her academic trajectory. She has worked relentlessly to climb to the top of her class, and the thought of a civil conflict jeopardizing her college prospects strikes her as the height of unfairness. In a single scene, Packer exposes the insularity of the laptop class—how they can read about national collapse yet continue to focus unblinkingly on résumé-building.

    Rustin shares his daughter’s blind spot. He believes his rationality and status shield him from whatever chaos brews outside their comfortable home, so he heads to the Imperial College Hospital as if nothing has changed. But when he arrives, he finds a skeleton staff, no leadership, and a pack of teenage looters closing in on the building, shouting about reclaiming a city stolen from them by Burghers. Their anger echoes the real-world contempt for Boomers—our generation’s hoarding of wealth, property, and opportunity, and the young’s belief that the American Dream was stolen and the ladder kicked away. The looters are led by Iver, a young man who once sat beside Selva in school. Rustin learns Iver is desperate to get medicine for his mother, who can no longer access care in the collapsing system. The gang consists of young men who failed in school and have no future—Hoffer’s True Believers in the flesh, clinging to nihilism because it’s the only story left to them.

    Their attempted looting is half-hearted; they’re too exhausted to fully ransack the hospital. Rustin placates them by promising free medical care for Iver’s mother. The moment marks a turning point for him. He once believed Burghers and Yeomen could coexist if they simply treated each other with decency, a kind of soft humanism. But Chapter One hints that civility may be dead—that the Burghers have grown complacent, valuing comfort more than democracy, drifting toward Nietzsche’s Last Man: a class so lulled by ease that it failed to maintain the institutions holding the nation together.

    It’s a bruising first chapter. As Andrew Sullivan noted, the novel “hits too close to home.” The subject matter is painful, but its resonance is undeniable. Though I haven’t been a diligent novel reader for over a decade, this one has enough voltage to keep me turning pages.

  • The Cruel Irony in Tatiana Schlossberg’s Fight to Live

    The Cruel Irony in Tatiana Schlossberg’s Fight to Live

    A few nights ago, I was tired of screens from setting up my Mac Mini desktop all day, so in bed, I put my laptop aside, reached for a print copy of The New Yorker, and read Tatiana Schlossberg’s essay “A Battle with My Blood.” On May 25, 2024, she gave birth to her daughter; on that same day she was diagnosed with acute myeloid leukemia, complicated by an especially cruel mutation called Inversion 3. She had to take in her newborn and her mortality in the same breath. Since then she has endured chemo, transfusions, and CAR-T-cell therapy—the same therapy that saved my brother from Burkitt lymphoma—while living under a prognosis that predicts she has a single year left at age thirty-four. The essay lodged itself in me, and I can’t let it go.

    Before reading her piece, I knew nothing about Schlossberg, except now I know she is the cousin of Robert F. Kennedy Jr., the newly appointed Secretary of Health and Human Services. It would be high satire if it weren’t real: she fights for her life while her cousin, a former heroin addict and tireless distributor of vaccine misinformation, dismantles the very funding streams that support leukemia research. Her mother even wrote to the Senate to block his confirmation, pointing out that he has never worked in medicine, public health, or government. It didn’t matter. He was confirmed anyway, as if spite were a qualification.

    Schlossberg wants to live long enough for her children to remember her. Her cousin’s policies seem engineered to ensure the opposite—not just for her, but for countless patients who depend on the research he’s busy defunding. Her fight is intimate; his carelessness is national. And it’s impossible not to feel the cruelty of that collision.